Introduction
In a 2014 article entitled 'Ecology, Race, and the Making of Environmental Publics: A Dialogue with Silent Spring in South Africa', anthropologist Lesley Green identifies obstacles to the creation of an 'environmental public' in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa. 1 The broader backdrop against which Green writes -one that is experienced globally to differing degrees and in often distinct manners -is that of environmental violence that is enacted both against racialized human bodies and against nature, and with this the entanglement between abuses of human and nonhuman rights.
For a start, violations of human rights, both in South Africa and beyond, have been and continue to often be carried out through the natural environment, for instance through scorched earth tactics, environmental remodelling, planting, the creation of enclosures and dispossession through land-grabbing. 2 Moreover, in the context of 'environmental *I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this article.
relation that, as I will come to, must be read through the legacy of colonial categorisations of forms of life. As Green writes: 'The violence that is racism […] finds its power in the classification of some as subjects, who have the right to speak, and others who are silent. The silenced are but objects or things in the racial imaginary in which people are reduced to the non-human; classed as a lesser species.' 7 In other words, classed as closer to 'nature'. 8 In the context of this special issue on the theme of 'Missing and Missed: The subject, politics and memorialisation of South Africa's colonial and apartheid dead', my contribution may at first appear somewhat oblique. For a start, beyond my reference to
Green's article, I write neither from South Africa nor of its colonial or apartheid history and legacies. Rather, as do many of the contributors, I respond here to the aim of both the special issue and the workshop that preceded it to take insights from the uniqueness of the status of 'missingness' in the South African context and to engage with a multitude of geopolitical settings. 9 (My reading will move between the European Holocaust to global humanitarian and forensic practices, through largely European and North
American science and technology studies and later Amerindian thinking in the Andes in order to gather together a more generalised set of questions and propositions.) I take
Green's analysis of the specificity of environmental publics in the South African context as a provocation to think through a specific kind of 'missing figure' on a global scale: that of the witness, albeit in an expanded sense.
The witness as missing figure
The missing figure to whom or which I refer here is not the missing witness as the object of past colonial or apartheid violence -the figure who has been stripped, precisely, of paying elites, the legacy of racism spills out like oil from a sunken ship' (2). Green speaks of the exorbitant cost of entry to South Africa's national parks, which excludes racialized sections of the population.
their status as subject or person, dehumanised and disappeared (i.e., been made missing), 10 and who is thus no longer able to speak and testify to their fate, be this to the legal court or to the court of public opinion or history. Nor is this the witness figure as the survivor (the witness as superstes) or onlooker (the witness as third party or testis) who gives testimony to public, quasi-legal hearings -for instance, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission; but global examples abound -about what took place.
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Rather, responding to both Green's reading of contemporary environmental publics and to the broader escalation of environmental violence on a global scale, the missing figure here designates the very manner in which we conceive of the witness, ontologically (across various forms of life and temporalities), epistemologically and politically. Read through the grammar of the double genitive, my title, 'the future of the witness', is intended to provoke two questions: in what ways must we re-conceptualise and expand our understanding of 'the witness' as we move into the future; and is it possible for a witness to testify both to present and future experiences -to the very future of life on this planet that is threatened through the ever-exacerbating Anthropocenic environmental violence that I have begun to outline above? 12 As such, witnessing in this context is not the act of bearing witness (testifying), in the present, to an event that took place (was witnessed or experienced) in the past, at a determined moment; rather, unlike the classical conception of testimony in which the 'thing' experienced is no longer present to the witness and as such is recalled through memory, witnessing is here conceived of as an ongoing process that entails the simultaneous registration of experiences (witnessing) and representation (bearing witness) to a public -as an accumulation of grievances in the context of environmental degradation and the subjugation of certain 'subjects' (be these human or non-human).
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My argument is that, where what is demanded is collective action and responses insofar as singular lives are violated within broader ecologies, the witness can no longer be a solitary figure; rather, the witness must instead be but one within a collectivity. Moreover, it is precisely in the context of a collectivity that the witness figure of which I write is constituted and produced. No longer the heroic, autonomous individual, the witness must thus be one of many, inscribed within a particular social milieu. As Sybille Krämer and Sigrid Weigel stress, despite the lack of agreement regarding concepts of and approaches towards testimony, there is at least one 'fundamental consensus': that testimony cannot be determined outside of a 'testimony constellation' or 'social constellation';
'"testimony"/"bearing witness" is a relational concept […] an intersubjective situation in a historically specific social world that is condensed in the act of testifying.' 14 Furthermore, although the figure of the witness has traditionally been confined to the human (in particular in the legal realm), I argue that where what is at stake is care for both human and more-than-human life, 15 witness collectivities need necessarily entail an expansion beyond the category of the human. Green argues for an environmentality that does not take recourse to modernist categories of subject and object -i.e., the categorisation that I began to sketch out above that forms the basis of the construction of both 'humanity' and 'nature', as well as race, as I will come to. 16 In other words, for an environmental public that entails more-than-humans. What I propose is that we extend African post-apartheid experiment with that of Latin American decoloniality (which I will turn to below), I would like to suggest that these two 'experiments' offer much when we rephrase environmental publics through the language of witnessing, especially when conceived in terms of subject and object and, as I am coming to, classical and persistent postcolonial questions of representation.
To be clear, I am not the first to propose that the figure of the witness be extended beyond the human; I take leave from a range of re-conceptualisations of the more-thanhuman witness in order to frame these in the context of witnessing collectivities, and to then focus on some specific questions around missingness and representation that I argue require pursuing further. 22 The group -which is comprised of architects, theorists, lawyers, scientists, programmers, artists and filmmakers -gathers and presents spatial analysis in legal and political forums across the world, with the aim of using the investigative apparatuses of the state against the state, above all in respect to its violations, in chime with the model of nongovernmental politics to which I will turn. 'Architecture' here is both used in a restricted sense (i.e., buildings, which are viewed as In considering nature as active participant in environmental publics, I do not propose that nature be conceived as witness figure strictly speaking insofar as this would entail anthropomorphism (for instance, that nature can bear witness linguistically, or be conceived as witness in the framework of trauma studies, memory studies, ethics, affect theory or psychoanalysis that are entailed within testimony theory). 24 Rather, my argument is that witnesses are produced in the context of more-than-human socialities, between the human and nonhuman. In the case of nonhuman life, I question whether documentary forms or sensors), and as a field of knowledge and mode of interpretation, concerned with relations between people and things, through spaces and structures, from the human body, through buildings and homes to the planet itself, which is proposed as the ultimate home or 'construction site'. and for whom no-one can testify. 30 In other words, for whom no-one can stand in as a third-party witness (testis) or 'spokesperson'. As Didier Fassin writes, 'in current usage', the boundary between the figures of superstes and testis 'is tending to become blurred'.
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The superstes has come to be supplanted by the testis in manifold ways, most notably reflexive elaboration on witnessing, memory and advocacy confirmed was that the humanitarian witness was not just a source of eye-witness testimony, but also a character to take on, one who pursues outspoken statements to be carefully deliberated within 30 'The "true" witnesses, the "complete witnesses," are those who did not bear witness and could not bear witness. They are those who "touched bottom": the Muslims, the drowned. The survivors speak in their stead, by proxy, as pseudo-witnesses; they bear witness to a missing testimony.
[…] Whoever assumes the charge of bearing witness in their name knows that he or she must bear witness in the name of the impossibility of bearing witness.' Giorgio Agamben, (largely Western, admittedly) public, political spheres. 35 The re-conceptualised task of witnessing was premised upon more than simply 'speaking truth to power'; rather than simply seeking to contest power (in particular neoliberal governmentality) it also strove to provide acts of care. By drawing from Michel Foucault's notion of ethics as a reflective and socially guided 'care of the self', 36 through her reading of MSF, Givoni argues that the cultivation of the self is not incompatible with a politics that underscores the responsibility towards or care for the other. 37 Here, the troubled performance of testimony that constituted the 'era of the witness' and the personalization of politics as the strategy through which neoliberalism causes people to lose sight of their collective interests'; 45 rather, the practice of witnessing as a simultaneous cultivation of the self and care for others as an active participation in political life allows for strategies of self-cultivation that are regarded as 'a way of relaunching the politicization of the personal' 46 -a means for citizens 'to carve out for themselves new avenues for public action beyond those already prescribed in official politics'. 47 An example of this is the citizen science environmental sensing project that I will later turn to below.
The future of the witness: beyond the human
In the context of contemporary environmental violence, with its roots in colonialism and the plantation system, there is an increasing awareness that what is necessary are practices of more-than-human 'world-making' that entail both human and nonhuman planetary subjects. 48 
Nature represents itself
For Green, one reason why an environmental public has been unable to gather in South Africa is a lack of attention (a blindness, perhaps) to 'the ways in which the logics of coloniality and race continue to inform the idea of nature in South Africa.' 61 It is here that the decolonial thinking developed primarily in Latin America, as well as the posthumanities, can be mobilised to inform environmental management and conservation science. Epistemologically and ontologically, modernity, as underpinned by coloniality, generated and continues to generate categories of race and nature through, precisely, its conception of subjects and objects: '[T]he nature-culture divide is one of the founding dualisms of modernist thought, and it is grounded in the division of subjects from objects.
[…] crucially, the collision of nature and object finds its outworking in racism, for race reduces people to objects via the language of biology and species.
[…]
racism naturalizes the idea of race' and 'turns it into nature'. 62 Drawing from Nelson
Maldonado-Torres's critique of modernity in Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity (2008), which engages with modernist thought's practice of turning some into subjects and others into objects, Green stresses how Western modernity has yet to overcome 'the legacy of dehumanisation that shaped colonialism and racism'. 63 As Rafi
Youatt notes in the context of international politics and the question of who or what can be seen as political actor (or political subject), the making of humanity as a category takes place across lines of race, coloniality, migrants and borders, war, humanitarianism and commodities. 64 'Who counts as human at any political moment is itself a byproduct of political life.' 65 to the environment and the conjunction between violations carried out against both human and nonhuman life, Nixon's book remains caught within the task of the decidedly human writer-activist, and rendering slow violence legible or intelligible to human sensibilities. 66 This is not to criticize Nixon's vastly important book, which has done much to change the discourse within environmental activism and the environmental humanities -and in fact to create, together with notable others, the field that we might now retrospectively name 'postcolonial environmental humanities'), 67 of 'subaltern'. 68 In this case, we now see the dangers of 'speaking for' and misrepresenting not only indigenous subjects but also nature. 
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In the context of Forensic Architecture, for instance, through the use of persuasion or rhetorical skill, the 'testimony' of the inanimate is 'ventriloquized' or interpreted in various forums (legal, political and/or cultural) in the context of constructing 'public 71 In the easy claims made by some western intellectuals that the oppressed are able to 'speak for themselves', the paradox is that the category of the sovereign subject is restored precisely within the theory that sets out to question it. Latour. 84 Rather than remain in the realm of the general, however, let us begin to unravel this through a particular practice, and in the specific vocabulary of witnessing -or, as we shall see, possible replacements or multispecies synonyms for this term that I have so far 96 It is in this sense that a new politics might begin to take shape.
As bioindicators, lichens are particularly pertinent to the expanded temporal schema of witnessing and bearing witness that I am suggesting here. Recalling the discussion above regarding how to narrate, visualise or represent environmental violations, the speculative gardening practices that Gabrys refers to 'do not merely "signal" that an event has occurred or is occurring' (i.e., in both the past and present) but also materialise relations and processes among and between organisms and ecologies that take place in the process of the accumulation (often slow and otherwise invisible) of pollutants, and of changes in environments due to extractive or damaging industries. 97 As such, 'bearing witness' in this bioindicative register does not merely entail sensing and indicating but also transforming environments in the present and future, across species divides.
Conclusion
To conclude, Gabrys's work with lichens suggests that nonhuman forms of life may (a) actively register environmental conditions and form parts of multispecies world-making practices, and (b) provide us with alternatives for the representational schemas that, however well-intentioned in terms of advocacy, often end up reinforcing an original silencing that they seek to correct. Here, the 'witness' (or 'bioindicator') can be called upon to 'give an account', but also functions in the productively ambiguous space of 'missingness' insofar as the injury borne witness to is often more qualitative, 98 resisting quantitative and classificatory capture. This qualitative aspect also extends into forms and practices of care, nurturing and world-making that take place across species and organism divides. Such a proactive or creative (rather than merely reactive) practices of care (rather than simply repair) are useful insofar as they undo or disregard modernist and colonial binaries of nature/culture and subject/object that underlie the deleterious consequences of extractivist governmentality, whereby nature is conceived as worth 'saving' or protecting only insofar as it is profitable to do so, for the sake of the human species.
Furthermore, maintaining the language of the witness, understood through the framework provided by Givoni, allows us to keep hold of witnessing as a distinctive form of ethics and politics that -more than other forms of activism, advocacy or representational practices -entails a practice that at once makes political and empirical claims and contests the individualism upon which contemporary neoliberal governmentality is premised. This is particularly pertinent in the context of environmental violence and the 'compliance-based environmental management' that Green speaks of, where states often displace responsibility for the work of care and repair onto NGOs and civil society. Here, the world-making evoked by Gabrys, which has a rich heritage in feminist technoscience, '[allows] for certain subjects and relations to gain a foothold'. 99 Just as 'humanitarian' disasters do not concern merely the human but instead the conditions that sustain life and enable certain (cultural and 'natural') forms of life and just as the 'rights of nature' are only in part about what we know as 'nature', the world-making practices that I refer to are formed across species. 100 Rather than rights, 98 Gabrys, 'Sensing Lichens', 358. 99 Gabrys, 'Sensing Lichens', 352. 100 See Gabrys, 'Sensing Lichens', 352.
